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THE LAW OF BLASPHEMY
CHRISTIANITY part of the Law of England? It would
I Sseem
that if it ever was so, it is so no longer. Such at least is
the conclusion which Austin's "simple-minded layman" will
undoubtedly draw from the recent decision of the House of Lords
in Bowman v. The Secular Society, Limited, [1917] A. C. 4o6. The
lawyer who recognizes that such phrases as the above can have lit·
tle or no value in legal science will be more concerned to note the
unanimous determination of the final court of appeal in Great
Britain in favor of the view of the law of blasphemy expressed
by Lord COLERIDGE, L. C. J., in Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote, 15 Cox
C. C. 231, against the contrary doctrine of the late Sir James Fitzjames STEPHEN, and the overruling by general consent (Lord FINr,AY, L. C., alone dissentin.1?) of the well-known case of Cowan v.
Milbourn, L. R. 2 Ex. 230. In the British constitution a judgment of
the House of Lords has the same finality as an Act of Parliament,
and so we may take it as settled for all time (in the absence of
intervention of Parliament) that in English law "the crime of blasphemy is not constituted by a temperate attack on religion in which
the decencies of controversy are maintained". (Lord FINLAY, L. C.,
at p. 423.)
What it is constituted by is perhaps, notwithstanding the pronouncements of five learned Lords of Appeal, not free from doubt.
It seems that in England as in Scotland "scurrility or indecency
is an essential element of the crime of blasphemy at common law",
(Lord FINLAY, ubi sup.); that "to constitute blasphemy at common
law there must be such as element of vilification, ridicule or irreverence as would be likely to exasperate the feelings of others and so
lead to a breach of the peace", (Lord PARKER, p. 446); that words
may be blasphemous "for their manner, their violence, or ribaldry,
or, more fully !tated, for their tendency to endanger the peace then
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and there, to deprave public morality generally, to shake the fabric
of society, and to be the cause of civil strife" (Lord SuMN~R, at
p. 466); that the offence is associated with, and perhaps constituted by, "violent, offensive, or indecent words" ; and "the common
law of England does not render criminal the mere propagation of
doctrines hostile to the Christian faith. The crime consists in the
manner in which the doctrines are advocated, and whether in each
case this is a crime is a question for the jury, who should be directed
in the words of ERSKINE, J., in Shore v. Wilson 1 quoted by the Master of the Rolls in his judgment on the present case", (Lord BucKMAS'l'ER, at p. 470) ; that ·'blasphemy is constituted by violent and
gross language, and the phrase 'reviling the Christian religion' shows
that without vilification there is no offence." (at p. 475). 2
To extract a definition of blasphemy from such a wealth of dicta
might be no easy work. But we must remember that in jure onmis
dcfinitio periculosa est and be thankful that if we do not know what
blasphemy is, at all events we know what it is not. So far, at least,
the judgment of the House of Lords is conclusive.
Before the House gave its decision there was room for doubt,
for uncertainty. The views of Lord CoLERIDGE and of Sir James
STEPHEN had their respective partizans. Today the uncertainty is
removed. We know what the law is, so far as this consists in
knowing what it is not, and with the same qualification, we know
what the law always has been; for the business of judges, however
eminent, of courts of justice, however august, is not to make law,
but to ascertain it. We must take it, then, that the Bench, presided
over by Lord RAYMOND, who in Rex v. Woolston, I Barn. K. B. 162,
refused to listen to an argument tending to show that Christianity
might be lawfully called in question, were wrong in their law, and
that they and the numerous later judges, who following HALE,
C. J.,3 have declared that "Christianity is parcel of the laws of
s "It ia "indeed still blasphemy, punishable at common law, scoffingly or irreverently
to ridicule or impugn the doctrines of the Christian faith, and no one would be allowed
to give or to claim any pecuniary encouragement for such purpose; yet any man may,
without subjecting himself to any penal consequences, soberly and reverently examine
and question the truth of those doctrines which have been assumed as essential to it.
And I am not aware of any impediment to the application of any charitable fund for the
encouragement of such inquiries." 9 CL. & F. at p. 524, cited by Lord Cozens-Hardy,
M. R. [1915], :z Ch. at p. 463.
~The learned judge refers to Harrison v. Evans, :z Burn's Ecc. Law at p. 218, in
which Lord Mansfield said:-''The common law of England * • • knows of no prosecution for mere opinions. For atheism, blasphemy, and reviling the Christian religion,
ihero have been instances .of persons prosecuted and punished upon the common law

...
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England", did not know what they meant, as, indeed, they very
likely did not.
It is possible that their Lordships are right in their history as,
beyond private liberty of question, they are right in their law.
Certainly there are indications-<The Queen v. Read (Fortesc. 98) is
a surprising example-of a disinclination on the part of the common law courts to burden themselves with matters which even so
late as the eighteenth century were considered to fall within the
competence of the ecclesiastical courts. On the other hand, the
prevailing sentiment of today towards religion is very different
from what it was two or two and a half centuries ago, and it cannot be denied, whatever legal theory may say to the contrary, that
the decisions of courts of justice take their color from the tendency
of the age. There will be many, therefore, who--the authoritative
pronouncement of the House of Lords notwithstanding-will still
be inclined to agree with the late Mr. Justice STSPHSN, that "to
say that the crime [of blasphemy] lies in the manner and not in
the matter appears to me to be an attempt to evade and explain
away a law which has no doubt-ceased to be in harmony with the
temper of the times".' However this may be, the House of Lords
has decided, and that for an English lawyer is the end of the
matter. The decision makes law. Therefore it would be impertinent to call it in question. But it is permitted to examine the processes of reasoning by which their Lordships arrived at their conclusion, and to this the remainder of this paper will be directed.
Like any other court administering the common law, the House
of Lords goes for its law to the cases. Accordi,ng to the now established rule it is bound by its own decisions, but not by the decisions
of any inferior tribunal. Nevertheless the pronouncements of inferior courts if not authoritative are at least persuasive. They
are entitled to be weighed in the balance of the judicial mind. The
presumption is that they were rendered in accordance with justice
and that they applied the right rule of law to the facts. Strictly
speaking, no decision goes beyond the established or assumed facts
of the particular case.6 So far the facts limit the rule. But just
as the laws of nature are collected from a multitude of single instances, so the rules of law are supposed to be generalised from
previous decisions. Both are generalisations from particulars but
not to the same degree. The great difference is that whereas the
laws of nature are implicit in the facts of nature so that all the
grouped facts illustrate and express the law, in the case of the laws
• Stephen Hist. Criminal Law, vol. a, p. 475.
1 Per Halsbury L. C. in Quinn v. Lealhem [15101] A. C. at p. 506.
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of man this is not so. There the uniformity which ultimately prevails as a rule of law is generalised not from all the grouped facts,
that is, from all the decisions relating to the same subject-matter,
but only from some of them. The others do not affirm the rule.
They contradict it. This must always be the case when the decisions
speak with uncertain or conflicting voices. The matter which comes
up for decision today, let us suppose, is not covered by authority.
There is no case on all fours with it. The ground is not already
occupied. The Court, then, must hunt about in the neighborhood,
as it were, for analogies. A rule must be looked for and found (for
found it must be) in other cases which have something in common, but perhaps not the one thing essential in common, with the
case under consideration. Very likely the doubt which arises in
the later case never presented itself to the judges who passed upon
the earlier cases. Perhaps they tacitly assumed as true what is
now called in question and if they refrained from affirming it did
so not because the proposition was doubted, still less denied, but
simply because it never occurred to them or to any one else to doubt
or deny it. This is especially likely to be the case at times when the
judicial mind is satisfied with a vague generality such as that which
asserts that Christianity is parcel of the laws of England. It is not
in such an atmosphere that the definition of blasphemy will receive
close analysis, or an exact line be drawn between the matter and
the manner of a blasphemous libel. So it may happen that for a
century or more the law remains uncertain because not thought out.
Cases accumulate, but the law is not elucidated. When at last a
straight issue arises which can be no longer ignored or evaded the
Court is under the necessity of deciding, and of deciding not upon
caprice, but by some supposed rule of law. The rule must be
looked for in the decisions, but it is not there. Instead of a clear
statement of principle we find only obscure suggestions of conflicting principles-some rhetoric, many dicta, little law, no guidance.
In such circumstances to say that the rule is found in the cases is
contrary to fact. Found in or suggested by some of the cases it
may be, but found in the cases in the sense that the laws of nature
are found in the phenomena of nature, it is not. So far from the
rule being derived from the decisions, the decisions are tested by
the rule. It is not a case of inductive reasoning, but of deduction,
the rule itself being antecedently determined on grounds of reason, convenience, public policy or individual prejudice. ·
The above contention is, of course, contrary to orthodox doctrine, but it is in accordance with what actually .takes place. The
decision of the House of Lords in Bowman v. The Secular Society,
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Limited, is a case in point. Their Lordships as an ultimate court
of appeal, untrammeled by previous decisions of their own House
were, in law, free to decide as they pleased. The cases, far from
being an aid, were something of an embarrassment. An extract
from Lord DuNEDIN's judgment shows that he would have been
more at ease without them.
"My Lords, I have said that I have formed my opinion not without hesitation; but that hesitation is due to one fact only. Had there
been no authorities to deal with, and I were to approach the matter
from the point of view of legal principle alone, I do not think I
should have felt much difficulty. What has troubled me is that I
think it is impossible to decide the case as I think it should be decided without going counter to what has been said by judges of
great authority in past generations. It is always, I feel, no light
matter to overrule such pronouncements. " 6
Clearly his Lordship has some way of arriving at the law which
does not consist in the examination of cases. Why need he examine
them since they do not bind him? He knows how the case "should
be decided" and regrets that it cannot be decided as it should be
without running counter to what has been said by eminent judges
of bygone days. Lord DUNEDIN finds all that is necessary to a
just decision in a recourse to "legal principle". What this means
is not quite apparent. A legal principle not enshrined in any decision relating to the law of blasphemy and yet, when applied, fit
to determine what that law is, scarcely admits of precise statement. When the learned judge speaks of approaching the matter
from the point of view of legal principle, does he mean more than
this-that his own sense of right and fitness, the reaction of his
mind to the moral environment, would, in his judgment lead to a
right conclusion? If this is so, the point is reached at which law
loses its identity in the larger precepts of morality. The learned
judge seems to tum his back upon the cases, which point nowhere
or in an undesired direction, to follow the plainer admonitions of
"private justice, moral fitness and public convenience"1 as he sees
them.
The other Lords do the same, though perhaps less consciously.
The Lord Chancellor, Lord FINLAY-passes in review the main
cases on the subject of blasphemy prior to Reg. v. Ramsa~ and
• [1917] A. C. at p. 432,

'"It could be done only on principles of private justice, moral fitness, and public
convenience; which, when applied to a new subject, make common law without a
precedent; much more, when received and approved by usage." Per Willes J. in Millar
v. Taylor, 4 Burr. at p. 2312.
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Foote,8 viz., Rex v. Taylor, 9 Rex v. Woolston,10 Re.xv. Williams, 11 •
("in connection with which Rex v. Mary Carlile12 and Rex v.
Eaton18 should be referred to"), Rex v. W addington,1 4 Reg. v.
H etherington!5 · In all the cases, he finds that the language used
w~s scurrilous and offensive, though this is less apparent in ·the
reports of Rex v. Woolston than in the others." But examination of
the libels in respect of which informations in that case were filed
* * * shows that the sacred subjects treated by him were handled
with a great deal of irreverence, and in many passages language
was used by him that was blasphemous in every sense of the term."10
The Lord Chancellor concludes: "The true view of the law of
blasphemy appears to me to be that expressed by Lord DENMAN
in Rex v. Hetherington, which is substantially in accordance with
that taken by Lord COLERIDGE i1i Reg. v. Ramsay and Foote and followed by PHILLIMORE, J., in Rex v. Boulter."11
It is unnecessary to review the judgments of the other members
of the Court, though each of them contains much that is of interest
and value. More cogently, perhaps, in them than in the Lord Chancellor's judgment, the in!pression, forces itself on the reader that
the court progresses from the rule to the cases, and not from the
cases to the rule. Lord DUNEDIN, we have seen, has recourse to
"legal principle.'' Lords PARKER and BUCKMASTER rely also upon
the argument ab inconvenienti. All agree with Lord FINLAY that it
is not and never has been part of the law of England that a temperate and respectful attack on the fundamental doctrines of Christianity eiposes the person who makes it to criminal proceedings.
Has it really never been so? Is it believed that such was the view
of Lord HOLT, who tried Taylor in 1675, of Lord RAYMOND who
tried Woolston in 1729, of Lord :K:ENYON, whose zeal for religion
converted Julian the Apostate into an apologist for Christianity at
the trial of Williams in 1797.18 of Lord ELLENBOROUGH, who sentenced Eaton in 1812? Would any one of these learned judges-all Chief Justices of England-have condoned as falling outside
the limits of legal blasphemy the lecture which Cowan proposed
• 15

Cox C. C.

231.

Vent. 293.
°Fitzg. 64; 2 Str. 834; 1 :Barn. K. :S. 162.
1126 St. Tr. 653 .
.. 3 :s. & Al. 167.
12 31 St. Tr. 927.
1' 1 :B. & C, 26,
11 5 Jur. 529; 4 St. Tr. (N. S.) 563 •
.. [1917) A. c. 422, 423.
17 72 J. P. 188.
.
12 26 St. Tr. 704, "Julian, Justin Martyr and Other Apologists•* * "·
• 1

1
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to deliver in Milboum's hall? To maintain the affirmative is to
do violence to the historical sense.
·
The second principal argument for the appellants in Bowman v.
The Seettlar Society, Limited, was directed to the point that a court
-0f law would not assist in the promotion of such objects as that for
which the Secular Society was formed whether they were criminal
or not. On this point the Lord Chancellor differed from his colleagues taking the view that the law was correctly stated in Briggs
v. Hartley and in Cowan v. Milbourn. His judgment contains
a grave protest against a court of law waiting upon the spirit of
the age.
"But we have to deal not with a rule of public policy which might
fluctuate with the opinions of the age, but with a definite rule of
law to the effect that any purpose hostile to Christianity is illegal.
The opinion of the age may influence the application of this rule,
but cannot affect the rule itself. It can never be the duty of a
Court of law to begin by inquiring what is the spirit of the age and
in supposed conformity with it to decide what the law is."111
This argument failed to carry conviction with the other memben.
()f the Court. If the objects for which the Secular Society was in<:orporated were not illegal-and on that point the Lords were
unanimous-what was to prevent it from claiming a legacy under
Mr. Bowman's will? Lord DUNEDIN deals with this point as follows:"Criminal liability being negatived, no one has suggested any
.statute in terms of which it-by which I mean the supposed use
of the money-is directly prohibited. There is no question of
offence against what may be termed the natural moral sense. Neither
'has it been held, I think, as being against public policy, as that
phrase is applied in the cases that have been decided on that head.
Now if this is so, I confess I cannot bring myself to believe that
there is still a terra media of things illegal which are not criminal,
not directly prohibited, not contra bonos mores, and not against
public policy. Yet that, I think, is the result of holding that anything inconsistent with Christianity as part of the law of England
<:annot in any way be assisted by the action of the Courts".20
The House of Lords therefore, Lord FINLAY, L. C., dissenting,
refused to follow Briggs v. ·Hartley21 and Cowan v. Milbourn, 22
which are accordingly overruled. For the reasons stated above one
11 [1917] A. C. at p. 432.
,.At p. 434·
21 19 L. J. (Ch.) 416.

n L. R.

2

Ex.

230.
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may be permitted to speculate whether the milder view of blasphemy accepted by Lord FINLAY himself does not conflict with his
canon forbidding courts of law to wait upon the spirit of the age.
Having gone so far he might have gone the whole way and concurred with the other Lords of Appeal in declaring Briggs v. Hartley and Cowan v. Milbourn to be wrongly decided.
That the law of blasphemy is today what it always was and always was what it is today, is, at all events in legal theory, the consequence of Bowman v. The Secielar Society, Limited, but it is a
consequence from which the members of the court, or some of them,
seem to shrink. The difficulty is to find a formula which admits
that the law is changed, while denying that this or that decision has
changed it. Lord SUMNER, apparently, throws the burden on the
jury. Just as a libel consists in a writing which "a jury, consisting
of twelve shopkeepers"28 finds to be defamatory, so sedition consists in what the same twelve men deem to be subversive of society,
and blasphemy (a species of sedition?) in what the jury considers
to be subversive of society because subversive of religion. "After
all, the Question whether a given. opinion is a danger to society is
a question of the times and is a question of fact".2 ~ If this is a
correct statement of the rationale of the law, we are not likely to
hear much more of prosecutions for blasphemy, for a generation
which tolerates the excursions into theology of Mr. George Moore
and of Mr. Wells (to say nothing of Monsieur Anatole France)
certainly has no very exacting standard as regards the so-called decencies of controversy. Another and perhaps safer formula is provided by Lord BucKMAS'l'ER, when he says-"If . . . the law is not
clear, it is certainly in accordance with the best precedents so to
express it that it may stand in agreement with the judgment of
reasonable men".25 As a standard for a court of ultimate appeal
these words seem unexceptionable. But it is noticeable that they
are inconsistent with the pretence of finding new law in old cases.
Is our time-honoured method of looking for law in previous decisions nearly played out? And, if so, what is to take its place? In
civil law jurisdictions the decisions of the courts are said to be
determined by the authority of reason rather than by reason of
authority. But this too has its weak side. A system which allows
a judge of first instance to decline to follow the considered judgment of a court of appeal simply because he disagrees with it, may
be gravely unfair to one of the litigants, who must either submit to
~Dicey,

Law of the Constitution, Ed. 8, p. 242.

" [1917] A. C. at p. 467.
:llAt P• 471.
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the expense and annoyance of an appeal or acquiesce in a decision
which nothing will persuade him to be other than capriciously unjust. In France and Germany, we are told, the modem tendency
has been in favour of recognising the binding force of decided cases.
This is still more markedly so in jurisdictions like the Union of
South Africa and the Province of Quebec-no doubt it is the same
in the Philippines,-where the civil law comes into close contact
with common law influences.· Perhaps it would be rash to assume
that this phenomenon manifests itself in all civil law countries, but
it would not be surprising if it did. Meanwhile there are some
indications that in common law jurisdictions the pendulum is swinging in the other direction. Nor can it well be otherwise. We live
in a world in which everything is in flux. How can law subsist if
it continues to patter the language of dead ages? Some new way
must be found-some way (pace Lord FINLAY) of interpreting law
in accordance with the spirit of the age.
The great significance of the judgments of the Lords in Bowman
v. The Secular Society, Limited, is that they have in fact attempted
to restate the law in harmony with modem conditions. But, and
this is equally significant, they have done so-if one may respectfully say it-with imperfect success. Fettered by a traditional
method of enquiry they have failed to solve the questions what
blasphemy is today, and how far and why it falls within the scope
of the criminal law. Let it be granted that the courts no longer
punish it as an insult to God. Is there no alternative but the paradoxical conclusion that it is punished merely as it tends to a breach
of the peace? Another view would be that blasphemy is essentially
an affront to a primordial right of a man's personality, a kind of
moral obscenity, an outrage upon the liberty of thought and belief
which the modem law allows to every citizen. Thus regarded,
whether blasphemy is criminally punishable will be largely a matter
of circumstance. Lapses from good taste and right feeling may be
overlooked in private conversation, which ought not to be tolerated
if paraded in public; and public plasphemy again will be more easily
condoned in an advertised lecture or address, when a shocked
auditor may be thought to have "come to the nuisance", than on
a tramcar or in the public street, where decent people are entitled
to protection from language which is offensive to their feelings.
This aspect of the case might be ventilated on a fitting occasion.
To do so now lies outside the scope of the writer's purpose.

R. W. LES, D.C.L., M.A.
Dean of the Facitlty of Law, McGill U11iversity;
Barrister at Law of Gray's Inn, London.

